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Abstract 
 
Recent research from experimental economics and social psychology finds that people’s 
perceptions of outcomes as well as of those dispensing outcomes is affected by factors other than 
the outcome itself.  Unfortunately, the political relevance of this finding is rarely addressed.  In 
this paper, we present the results of original experiments in which subjects are required to react 
to identical outcomes rendered by decision-makers with ostensibly different traits.  Specifically, 
we manipulate (the subject’s belief regarding) whether a decision-maker wanted to be a decision-
maker, did not want to be a decision-maker, or earned the right to be a decision-maker.  In 
addition, we manipulate whether or not decision-makers have a personal financial interest in the 
outcome.  The results suggest that, quite apart from the outcome itself, both the manner by which 
the decision-maker came to be the decision-maker and especially whether or not the decision-
maker has a vested interest in the outcome affected people’s satisfaction with the outcome they 
received and their perceptions of the fairness of the decision-maker.  People’s satisfaction with 
authoritative allocations of resources is not driven solely by the amount of resources they receive; 
rather, it is also influenced by the traits and considerations of the allocators, a finding entirely 
consistent with the burgeoning research on the importance of people’s concern with their role in 
the social unit.  
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During the past 30 years or so, dissatisfaction with government and especially 
governmental decision makers has been quite high in the United States as well as most other 
countries.  While dissatisfaction is certainly not universal, as is indicated by the increase in 
support in the U.S. after the disasters of 9-11-2001, the norm in modern developed societies 
seems to be disillusionment with government.  In this paper, we examine the conditions that 
might lead people to be more satisfied with authoritative decisions and the officials who make 
them.  To do so, we employ laboratory experiments in which people are presented with an 
outcome rendered by a decision maker and then asked to react.   
An obvious variable to expect to influence people’s satisfaction with a governmental 
decision is the extent to which people get what they want; in other words, the outcome.  We take 
as a given that outcome influences people’s satisfaction, but we also take it as not particularly 
interesting or helpful.  Government is by definition an allocator of scarce resources.  
Consequently, the citizens to whom resources are and are not allocated will frequently be 
disappointed with their lot.  Simply giving people more undoubtedly would improve their 
happiness but giving people more is rarely possible.  Pies are not always growing and getting less 
than they think they deserve from government is a fact of life for most people.  Thus, the real 
question of interest becomes whether steps can be taken to make people less dissatisfied with 
disappointing outcomes.   
Fortunately, recent research in experimental economics and social psychology, frequently 
deriving hypotheses from biological and evolutionary theory, suggests that factors other than 
outcome alter people’s satisfaction with authoritative decisions.  After briefly reviewing this 
theory and some of the empirical research connected to it, we set up, conduct, and report the 
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results of our own original research on the conditions that make people less negative about those 
decisions and the makers of decisions.  Our findings indicate that, while it may not be possible to 
make people completely satisfied with an unfavorable decision, it is possible to make them much 
less dissatisfied, often to the point that they are quite accepting of the decision.  People are not 
just after short-term tangible gains; rather, they have a range of much more sophisticated interests 
and the source of these intangible interests is ancient and enduring. 
 
Evolutionary Biology as a Guide to Human Preferences 
 
Increasingly, evolutionary biology is serving as a wellspring of hypotheses in the social 
sciences.  The allure is obvious since evolution provides a theory of human preferences while 
existing analytical constructs in political science, such as rational choice and behavioralism, do 
not even pretend to offer such a theory.  To be sure, in their own way, both have been quite 
useful.  Behavioralism plots proximate environmental influences on behavior while rational 
choice identifies the optimal strategy for achieving an outcome given an assumed preference, but 
neither offers any guidance regarding the ultimate source of preferences.  Evolutionary biology 
may not in the end turn out to be the actual basis for preferences, we cannot say for sure, but it 
does provide a theory of preferences.  And as rational choice scholars frequently and accurately 
point out, “a theory...can only be supplanted by a superior theory” (Chong, 1996: 47).  Until the 
arrival of this superior theory, we turn to evolutionary biology for guidance and encourage others 
at least to consider doing the same. 
The central theoretical insight is simple: evolutionary pressures lead people, like other 
organisms, to behave in a fashion that promotes long-term survival.  Because of selection 
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pressures, those not behaving in this fashion will be decreasingly represented in future 
generations, so those people living today are generally in possession of behavioral tendencies that 
have stood the test of time–a long time.  In fact, some of these behavioral tendencies may be 
better suited to the environment of hunter-gatherers in which humans existed for hundreds of 
thousands of years than to the modern mass, post-industrial societies that have been our home for 
just a few generations.   
What are these factors that could reasonably be thought to have promoted survival over 
the millennia?  This is not the place for a detailed presentation of the expectations flowing from 
evolutionary psychology, but among the most basic survival behaviors, and the one of most 
relevance to our research here, is the ability to be a respected part of a viable social unit.  
Humans are heavily reliant upon their social skills.  Groups and the exchanges that occur within 
real groups, enhance both acquisition of provisions and protection against predators, including 
out-group conspecific predators.  People who are not accepted members of a properly-
functioning group will see their survival and reproductive odds diminish markedly (for further 
explication, see Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Pinker, 2002).  Continued human existence is in 
large part attributable to our social nature.1
1Just as it is in equally large part now threatened by that social nature.  Being social is not being “good” as 
it can entail mindless conformity, unthinking obedience to authority figures, taking pleasure in the 
misfortune of others, and violent hostility toward out-group members. 
In fact, human beings have developed a remarkable set of social capacities.  Most can 
identify subtle moods of other people merely by seeing photographs of their eyes (see Baron-
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Cohen, 2003), most can predict how others will behave in game-playing situations after visiting 
with them for just a few minutes (Frank, 1988; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993), and most 
people’s memories work significantly better when social as opposed to non-social factors are at 
play (Chiappe, Brown, and Rodriquez, 2002).  Moving closer to the political realm, an argument 
can be made that evolution has left us with a decidedly and understandably ambivalent attitude 
toward leadership.  Clearly, certain important tasks, including the killing of large game and 
engaging in battles with neighboring groups/clans, are facilitated by group unity and coordination 
of the sort that requires leadership.  At the same time, one of the most common traits in the entire 
human anthropological record is an aversion to “big man behavior” when the group is not in  
obvious need of it (see, for example, Diamond, 1997; Boehm, 1999).  Nothing is more poisonous 
to the vitality of a group than an influential individual bent on furthering personal ends at the 
expense of others.   
Accordingly, though humans in general are highly sensitive to being taken advantage of, 
they are even more sensitive to being taken advantage of by an important member of the group, 
such as a decision maker (see Hibbing and Alford, 2004).  From the rank-and-file member’s 
point of view, the consequences of a decision maker who plays others for suckers are dire.  Such 
behavior indicates either that the member has lost a place of respect in the group or that the 
decision maker has turned to the dark side and habitually acts in a self-interested fashion.  If it is 
the latter, the rank-and-file group member can take some comfort in the fact that the unfavorable 
treatment was not meted out because of anything specific about the member, but this is likely to 
be cold comfort because the group itself is in danger.  Humans’ social nature leads them to be 
wary cooperators, eager to contribute their fair share to the group but only when they believe 
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others are doing the same.  An act of unpunished non-cooperation by any member of a group of 
conditional cooperators has the potential to spread like wildfire (see Boyd and Richerson, 1992; 
Gintis, 2000; Nowak, Page, and Sigmund, 2000; Fehr and Fishbacher, 2003), but when the act 
comes from a decision maker such contagion effects are even more probable.   
Fear of non-cooperation and especially of being the victim of a non-cooperator is no 
doubt connected to the well-documented ability of humans to detect “cheaters.”  People are much 
better at solving a problem if it involves violation of a social contract than a problem that is of 
equal intellectual difficulty but does not involve such a violation (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1992).  And no doubt it is also connected to the willingness of most humans, when they 
have identified a cheater, to engage in altruistic punishment by using their own resources to 
inflict punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Fehr and Gachter, 
2002).  Cheater detection and altruistic punishment are important elements of humans’ social 
repertoire, but in terms of political implications, aversion to self-appointed leaders, or “anti-big-
manism,” as it is sometimes called, is of even more interest.  In fact, anti-big manism may be 
seen as an attempt to avoid being played for a sucker, since people in a position of power are 
more likely to be able to take advantage of others.       
For eons, human beings fastidiously put down attempts by other members to set 
themselves apart.  Successful hunters were expected to share game with the entire village 
(Hawkes, 2001).  And self-important and self-serving behaviors were immediately met with 
ridicule and reduced esteem (Boehm, 1999).  Behavioral variation across hunter-gatherer 
societies is extraordinary but “social accounting” systems for keeping track of those doing their 
share and those too big for their britches are perhaps as close as any traits come to being 
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universal.  The ability to identify a would-be big man and the willingness to visit immediate 
social sanctions upon that individual is long-standing and has not atrophied with the advent of 
the less egalitarian governmental systems characterizing modern mass societies.  In fact, since 
“big people” (decision makers) are now officially designated and given special authority, the 
ability to identify those with their own and not the group’s interest at heart and the willingness to 
rein in self-serving decision makers are all the more crucial.  Part of the disillusionment with 
government, we believe, is traceable to humans’ deep-seated suspicion of those who want to 
make decisions for others.  At an intellectual level many of us recognize the need for leadership; 
at a more emotional level, most of us are turned off by individuals who want to be leaders and/or 
who are in a position to act in a self-interested fashion.   
Politics becomes an odd game as a result.  The candidates’ respective stances on crucial 
issues of the day, though certainly part of the picture, are frequently less influential than the 
candidates’ stories about why they are seeking office and how selfless they are.  We hear claims 
that they were called to service, perhaps against their will, and that they have only the best 
interests of others and of the country at heart.  They criticize opponents because of their issue 
positions but perhaps even more commonly because they “will do anything to get elected,” 
including flip-flopping on issues and mindlessly obeying the results of political polling.  Policy 
stances become less the focal point than the motivation of the individuals seeking office.  
Successfully impugning the motives of a political opponent often translates into victory and the 
issues themselves occasionally become secondary.  A desire for power can disqualify people for 
public office unless a convincing case can be made that they are seeking power for the betterment 
of others.  Reluctant office-holders, from Cincinnatus to Colin Powell, are highly desirable, 
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however even if their policy positions were unchanged, their seductive appeal would evaporate if 
word leaked out that they really did want power.   
But determining an individual’s inner motivation is difficult.  To do so, people frequently 
take cues from the process by which decisions were made or the process by which individuals 
became decision makers in the first place.  This makes sense.  If a main goal is, as we claim, to 
determine not the policy positions of would-be leaders but their motivations, political observers 
would be well advised to pay careful attention to traits of the decision makers as well as the 
constraints institutions place on the ability of decision makers to manifest those traits.  
Constitutions try to design procedures that will limit self-serving behavior.  Certainly this was 
Madison’s main goal and he was quite right to pursue it.  He wanted to create procedures by 
which selfish behavior would be checked by other decision makers and, if that failed, by the 
voters. 
In this context, the concern for procedural justice, so ably articulated by social 
psychologists such as Tom Tyler (Tyler, 1990; see also, Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Lind and 
Tyler, 1988), fits perfectly with evolutionary theory.  Tyler and others have demonstrated that, 
with outcomes controlled, people are quite sensitive to general features of the process by which 
decisions are made.  In some decision making contexts, such as those surrounding judicial 
decisions, the reactions of those people who felt that all sides were listened to, that the decision 
was objective, and that the motives of decision makers could be trusted, were more positive than 
the reactions of those who did not (Tyler, 2001).  Why would people feel better about decisions 
emanating from certain processes than they would about that very same decision emanating from 
other processes?  Because these features of the process say something about the motivations of 
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the decision makers and about the role of rank-and-file group members.  If the decision is being 
made “on the merits,” then by definition the decision maker cannot be manipulating the process 
for selfish ends.2
In this light, the evolutionary account provides a theoretical basis for the empirical 
findings long present in the procedural justice literature.  It suggests that people do not simply 
prefer certain procedures because they do but rather they prefer them because certain procedures 
help to protect the group and an individual’s place in that group.  As such, the theory may help to 
identify the specific aspects of the process that are likely to be at the center of people’s 
preferences.  Indeed, if our reading of the theory is correct, people’s core desire is to prevent the 
wrong kind of decision maker from being in a position to act in a self-interested fashion.  The 
procedures for making decisions cannot really be separated from the traits of those making the 
decisions.  Plato thought non-self-interested behavior would be engaged in by decision makers if 
we could recruit and train the right kind of people.  Madison thought that institutions were 
needed to prohibit decision makers from behaving in the self-interested behavior that is the 
inclination of all people.  The desired type of behavior was remarkably similar but the manner by 
which that behavior was thought most likely to be produced was quite different. 
2For a useful investigation of the interaction of outcomes and processes, see Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 
1996.  
People’s end goal is not a certain set of procedures just as it is not a certain set of 
outcomes; people’s end goal is to be a respected part of a viable social group, a group in which 
leaders are behaving cooperatively and not selfishly.  If this line of thinking is correct, positive 
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reactions to authoritative decision makers should be engendered not just by certain procedures 
with outcome held constant but also by decision makers possessing certain traits with process 
and outcome held constant. 
In the remainder of this paper, we wish to concentrate more directly on the traits of the 
decision maker as opposed to more amorphous features of the process since we believe people’s 
empirically established preferences for procedural justice are better seen as preferences for 
getting the right kind of decision maker to have the right kind of motivation.  Previous research 
on  public reactions to authoritative decisions has provided a better sense of the effects of general 
procedures than of the type of decision maker involved in the decisions.  Institutions and 
procedures may be able to de-personalize politics to a certain extent, but individual variation 
remains.  In the empirical part of our paper, we analyze whether or not people’s tendencies to be 
pleased, satisfied, and accepting of the same outcome rendered by the same procedure is 
influenced by variations in three important human traits: ambition, entitlement, and self-interest.   
 
The Role of Decision Maker Desire and Entitlement 
If we are right, procedures are only part of the story and people are actually seeking 
certain characteristics in decision makers.  Thus, in the initial battery of experiments we designed 
and describe below, the procedures by which decisions were made were held constant.  Indeed, 
these procedures were simplicity itself.  The experimental subject was led to believe that another 
person (in actuality, an experimental fiction) had the authority to divide a small pot of money 
($20) between him/herself and the subject.  We next informed the subject that the allocator had 
decided to keep $17 and to pass along just $3 to the subject and then ascertained the reaction of 
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the subject to this decision that tangibly affected the money the subject would receive at the end 
of the experiment.  By not using a real allocator, we were able to standardize the outcome.  All 
that we varied in this experiment was the manner by which the subject believed the allocator 
came to hold the position of allocator (or decision maker). 
There were three possibilities.  Subjects in the first cell were told the individual with 
whom they had been paired was made the allocator because he or she wanted that position more 
than the subject.  Subjects in the second cell were told that the individual with whom they had 
been paired was made the allocator even though he or she wanted that position less than the other 
person involved (the experimental subject).  And finally subjects in the third cell were told that 
the individual with whom they had been paired was made the allocator because he or she had 
earned that position.   
The manner in which we made these presentations believable follows. Subjects were first 
told that they had been randomly matched with an anonymous second subject who was 
contemporaneously at a computer terminal in another room and with whom they would play only 
one game.  In a pre-test completed by all subjects we asked how badly each wanted to be the 
allocator on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being an extreme desire to make the allocation decision.  
We also asked them how much total time in minutes they would spend traveling to and from the 
experimental site.  Those subjects randomly assigned to Cell 1 were told that the player with 
whom they had been matched gave a higher number than was given by the subject on the “want 
to be decision maker” spectrum.3 Those subjects randomly assigned to Cell 2 were told that the 
3In the five cases in which the subject answered 10 (the highest score possible), the subject was informed 
that the other player also answered 10 and had been randomly selected to be the allocator.   
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player with whom they had been matched gave a lower number than was given by the subject.4
And those subjects randomly assigned to Cell 3 were told that the individual with whom they had 
been matched had invested more travel time in coming to the experiment.5
As mentioned above, after these preliminaries, each subject was then informed of the 
allocator’s decision to pass along only $3 of the $20 and asked, via several items in a post-test, to 
provide reactions.  The most relevant of these items for our purposes pertained to satisfaction 
with the outcome ($3) and perceptions of the fairness of the allocator.  More specifically, 
subjects were asked how fair or unfair they though the allocator was, using a 7-point scale with 6 
equating to “very unfair” and 0 to “very fair,” and they were asked to estimate their satisfaction 
with the money they received, again on a 7-point scale with 6 equating to “very unsatisfied” and 
0 to “very satisfied.”  As it turns out, levels of satisfaction and perception of fairness were highly 
correlated (r =.75) so we combined these two measures into a simple additive “scale of 
negativity” ranging from 0 to 12 with higher values being greater negativity.   
4No subjects reported the lowest possible level of desire to be the allocator, so we could always say the 
other player had less desire. 
5No subjects reported the highest possible driving time, so we could always say that the other player spent 
more time traveling. 
If our interpretation of evolutionary theory is correct, the greatest negativity should be in 
evidence when subjects believe the decision maker with whom they had been matched craved 
power since these are the individuals about which other group members worry.  This is “big 
man” behavior.  Subjects should be somewhat less negative when they believe their counterpart 
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abjured power since such an individual is less likely to raise ancient concerns.  Expectations 
based on a more rational or outcome-based view of human behavior would not anticipate 
reactions to a $3 allocation in a single-play game to be any different whether they were rendered 
by an ambitious decision maker or not.  Finally, subjects should be the least negative when their 
counterpart did something to earn the right to be the decision maker.  Being entitled to a position 
of authority is much more tolerable than doing nothing for it or, worse yet, than openly seeking 
that position.  In fact, previous research provides evidence of such an entitlement effect, though 
virtually all of this evidence pertains to the divider and not the receiver.  In other words, we know 
that when people believe they have earned the right to be the allocator they keep a greater share 
of the money (see Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994) but 
the evidence that receivers are more deferential to decision makers entitled to that role is less 
clear.  And the evidence on the role of ambition, holding the outcome of the decision constant, is 
even less compelling (though see Hibbing and Alford, 2004). Scholars have focused too much 
on outcome and process and not enough on decision maker traits. 
Figure 1 presents our initial results. They indicate that the pattern is exactly the one we 
expected.  Subjects are more negative toward a $3 allocation when it is made by a decision maker 
who craved power.  They are somewhat less negative when the decision maker was not desirous 
of power (relative to the subject).  And they were less negative still when they believed the 
decision maker had been given that slot because of the amount of time invested in attending the 
experimental activities.  The differences are not substantively huge, but they are plainly evident 
and they do traditionally accepted significance levels even with the small N characteristic of 
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experimental research.6 Subjects faced with an allocator eager for power on average registered 
9.37 on the negativity scale with 12 being maximum negativity and 6 being neutrality, neither 
negative nor positive.  Those subjects whose allocator had not wanted to be the allocator were 
less negative at 8.60 and those subjects whose allocator had unwittingly earned the position by 
traveling for a longer time period were the least negative at 7.93–even though all subjects 
received the same allocation.  Clearly these variations in the traits displayed by allocators in 
receiving their position are not powerful enough to make people happy about a truly 
disappointing outcome, but movement is noticeably present.  In some respects, it is remarkable 
that subjects receiving just $3 can be made to score less than 8 on the scale (with 6 being neutral) 
simply because the decision was made by a meritorious decision maker. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
We also gave subjects in these three cells the opportunity to accept or reject the offer 
proposed by the allocator with the stipulation that if they rejected the proposal neither the subject 
nor the allocator would receive anything.  This arrangement is commonly known as the 
ultimatum game (see Guth and Tietz, 1990; Thaler, 1992, for good reviews).  The ultimatum 
game is now the most widely employed experimental scenario in the social sciences and the 
results from it are consistent.  Allocators are reasonably generous in their offers and receivers are 
surprisingly willing to reject those allocations that are ungenerous (see Nowak, Page, and 
Sigmund, 2000, for a summary).  Our theory, as might be expected, is that subjects faced with an 
allocator who craved power will be much more likely to reject the $3 proposal (even though 
rejecting it costs them $3) than will subjects dealing with an allocator who did not want that 
6One-tailed tests are used throughout since we have clear directional expectations for the results.   
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position or, especially, an allocator who earned that position by traveling a relatively long time. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
As can be seen from Figure 2, many of our subjects were willing to engage in altruistic 
punishment.  More subjects accepted than rejected the $3 proposal but a significant minority (just 
under 40 percent overall) rejected the lowball offer.7 But the feature of interest to us is the 
pattern across experimental cells.  Here we find that the results, once again, comport nicely with 
our expectations.  Rejection rates of the $3 approached 50 percent when the allocator was 
believed to be an individual who had a craving for power, dropped to 40 percent when the 
allocator had not wanted that privileged position, and dropped still farther, to just 30 percent, 
when the allocator earned the right to fill that position.  The manner by which individuals come 
to power apparently affects not only subjects’ level of negativity regarding the outcome and the 
decision maker but also their tendency to accept the decisions that are made.8
Self-Interested and Non-Self-Interested Decision Makers 
7Our results indicate a higher overall acceptance rate than is common in the literature.  No doubt the major 
reason for this is that in order to facilitate recruiting of a non-student population we offered a guaranteed 
inducement of $10 with the chance of earning up to $20 more.  This guaranteed money undoubtedly drove 
up the acceptance rated across the board.  This is of less concern to us since our interest is in the patterns 
across cells rather than the overall level. 
8Though these differences are significant only at the more permissive .10 level. 
The method by which a decision maker became the decision maker is obviously a factor 
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in explaining subjects’ reaction but, consistent with evolutionary theory, we expect that decision 
makers’ opportunity to use their position for personal gain will be another factor.  Specifically, it 
seems likely that subjects will be more negative toward decisions when decision makers benefit 
personally from that decision.  Indirect but real-world support for this speculation can be found in 
the persistent pattern of courts being viewed by the public more favorably than legislatures.  In 
the United States, for example, people are much more likely to believe that members of Congress 
benefit personally from the decisions they make than they are to believe that judges benefit from 
the decisions they make.  Members of Congress are busy ingratiating themselves to special 
interests and can reap large dividends, the public believes, by voting yea rather than nay.  Judges, 
on the other hand, are not believed to be materially affected by whether they rule in favor of 
Smith or in favor of Jones.  It is certainly possible that this is one of the reasons public support 
for the Court is always higher than public support for Congress (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
1995; 2002), and this pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that, other things being equal, self-
interested decision makers will lead to more negativity than non-self-interested decision makers. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we took the following steps.  Rather than introduce 
another small cell in which subjects were led to believe the allocator did not have any self-
interest in the decision, we informed all subjects, after they had provided their initial reactions to 
the self-interested allocator (see above), that there had been a mistake and that their allocator had 
actually been dividing the $20 between the subject and another individual.  They were further 
told that the allocator was being played a flat fee for making this decision.  In other words, 
subjects were led to believe that the allocator was actually a neutral third-party, receiving a salary 
to make decisions much as is the case with judges.  With this new information in mind, subjects 
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were again asked to rate levels of satisfaction and fairness on the same 7-point scales, even 
though the size of the allocation to the subject ($3) had not changed.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Our expectation is that levels of negativity will be reduced when allocators are not 
believed to be personally gaining from the decision (remember that in Figures 1 and 2 the 
allocator was able to keep whatever share of the $20 that was not given to the subject).  As can 
be seen from Figure 3, these expectations are borne out.  The mean level of discontent for all 
subjects when the allocator was self-interested was 8.63 but this figure dropped to just 7.80 when 
subjects were led to believe that they had in fact received the $3 from an allocator who had 
nothing to gain from giving the subject that sum.  These findings on the importance of the 
variations in allocators’ motivations are perfectly consistent with Tyler’s work on the importance 
of a decision’s institutional context and also findings from experimental economics on people’s 
fear of being played for a sucker.  Many times, people are upset with a small allocation not 
simply because they wanted more of whatever is being allocated but because of what that small 
allocation says about them and about those making the decision.  Being played for a sucker does 
not automatically happen whenever people receive a small allocation.  Rather, it happens when 
someone uses their position to benefit themselves at others’ expense.  The results in Figure 3 
support the belief that people would be as happy with a small allocation offered by a non-self-
interested decision maker as they would with a larger allocation offered by a self-interested 
decision maker. Reactions to decisions are much richer than preprogrammed response to the 
specific outcome provided.  Evolutionary theory may not be right, but it does offer an 
explanation for humans’ preferences on this score–and traditionally employed analytical 
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constructs in the discipline do not. 
 
Combining Mode of Becoming the Decision Maker and the Nature of the Decision 
Since each subject responded twice, once to an allocator they thought to be self-interested 
and once to an allocator they thought to be neutral, and since each subject was also in one of the 
three cells pertaining to an allocator who craved power, abjured power, or earned power, we can 
look at the manner in which method of acquiring the position of allocator and motivation in 
making the allocation decision interact.  We are left with six possibilities: a self-interested 
allocator who craved power; a self-interested allocator who abjured power; a self-interested 
allocator who earned power; a non-self-interested allocator who craved power; a non-self-
interested allocator who abjured power; and a non-self-interested allocator who earned power.  It 
is possible for us to identify the level of negativity engendered by each type of allocator. 
Expectations concerning the degree to which each of these six situations will lead 
respondents to react negatively are not crystal clear.  In order to state expectations with 
confidence, we would need to know whether the method of acquiring power (Figures 1 and 2) 
trumps the allocator’s motivation to use power (Figure 3).  Evolutionary theory expects that both 
method of acquiring power and motivation to use power will matter but it does not offer clear 
guidance regarding which will matter more.  Thus, we present this portion of the study as an 
exploration designed to see if motivation or selection method is more potent.  These results are 
presented in the table below: 
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Decision Maker Who Was...                                                   Negativity Scale 
Self-Interested and Craved Power                       9.36 
 
Non-Self-Interested and Craved Power    8.76 
 
Self-Interested and Abjured Power          8.58 
 
Self-Interested and Earned Power          7.92 
 
Non-Self-Interested and Abjured Power    7.32 
 
Non-Self-Interested and Earned Power    7.32 
The pattern is generally the one that theory and previous results lead us to expect, with 
perhaps one interesting exception.  As expected, the highest negativity score is produced when 
the allocator is desirous of power and is in a position to use that power to better him/herself, just 
as the lowest negativity score is produced when the allocator earned the right to be the allocator 
and is not in a position to use that power for his/her own ends.  Whether ambition or motive is 
more important is not evident in the results.  The two lowest groups in negativity are indeed 
groups in which the allocator had been non-self-interested, but the second highest group in 
negativity is the group facing a non-self-interested but power-hungry allocator.  Thus, further 
research will be necessary to partition the relative importance to subjects of these two decision 
maker traits.  It may even be that there is an interaction effect at work.  But the overall difference 
from the most to least negative groups is substantial, covering more than two full points on this 
12-point scale, even though the outcome was always the same.9
9The difference between the high and low group is significant at the .02 level (paired sample t-test). 
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Conclusion 
Why do people care about things that are irrelevant to outcome?  Why do they care about 
outcomes even when the outcome does not mean anything to them?  We believe the key is that 
people care about the health of their group and their own status in it, and indications of these 
factors are present quite apart from the tangible outcome received.  Evolutionary pressures have 
encouraged human beings to care about such things because organisms that do not care about 
groups or their own status are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage.  In the political realm, 
the widespread aversion to people who desire power and to people who use power to benefit 
themselves at our expense is quite likely genetically based–and adaptive–since individuals who 
do not notice or mind when a fellow group member is power hungry and/or self-serving are 
unlikely to do well in the evolutionary contest. 
We recognize that this line of thought will strike many political scientists as curious or 
worse.  Most of us have been trained to believe that preferences are entirely the product of 
environmental forces and that they are therefore completely unrelated to genetic forces but 
exciting research at the intersection of the life and social sciences is revealing the extent to which 
even complex social behaviors are connected to genetic factors (see especially Caspi et al., 2002; 
2003).  Future research will provide even more evidence that social preferences and behaviors 
are not merely environmentally driven but are rather the product of a fascinating interaction of 
genes and the environment.  Certainly, other explanations for phenomena of the sort present in 
our findings are possible but we have yet to see these explanations satisfactorily articulated.  
Often the claim is simply that “that is the way people are” but this claim is meaningless and 
atheoretical.  As social scientists our job is to understand why people are the way they are.  
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Evolutionary theory at least provides a reason and this is what sets it apart from existing 
analytical constructs.  We invite others to offer their own theories about the origins and nature of 
human preferences especially as these preferences pertain to leaders and the decisions they make.  
Just as evolutionary theory is viewed with suspicion by many political scientists, so are 
laboratory experiments but experiments allow us to investigate behavioral primitives in a way 
that is impossible with more context-dependent methodologies.  They are not intended to reflect 
the real world in all its complexity.  Unlike the decision makers in our experiments, decision 
makers in the real world of government have to make multiple decisions, operate in the context 
of institutions with rich histories, and sometimes have the chance to explain the rationale for 
their decisions, run for reelection, or both.  All these factors may very well affect the way people 
react to decisions and we sincerely hope that future researchers will add each of these layers of 
complexity, preferably one at a time so that it will be possible to learn the precise cause of any 
changes in results.  But without a simple baseline, identification of the specific contextual factors 
that are and are not powerful becomes problematic. 
Regardless of the extent to which readers are persuaded by the usefulness of evolutionary 
theory and laboratory experiments, we believe the results presented here indicate that people’s 
reactions to decisions are based in part on something deeper than either the tangible outcomes 
they happen to receive or their general perceptions of the procedures that were employed.  We 
happily accept that outcome and process are important but we believe that reactions to 
authoritative decisions, in a larger sense, are best seen as the products of people’s interpretations 
of what is being communicated about the group and their own place in the group.  To make these 
interpretations, people draw upon the outcome itself, the procedures by which decisions were 
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made, and also the traits they perceive decision makers to possess.  We believe decision maker 
traits have been under-emphasized in previous research.  For example, more than political 
scientists realize, people’s goal in a political campaign is not to determine each candidate’s 
position on a broad range of issues but to determine the nature of the candidates, their 
motivations, concerns, and ambitions.  Only by getting a read on the outcome, procedures, and 
decision maker traits can people be in a position to make the informed judgments that have well-
served human beings for hundreds of thousand of years; judgments that have allowed people to 
preserve a relatively healthy social life even as decision makers are now granted authority that, 
without proper public attentiveness and sensitivity, could be used to the detriment of the group 
and the individual.   
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Figure 1: Effects of Decison Maker Selection Method on Negativity 
toward the Decision and Decision Maker
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*Negativity of Receiver ranges from 0 to 12 where 0 equals a subject perceiving the decision 
maker as completely fair and being completely satisfied with the $3 allocation and 12 equals a 
subject completely unsatisfied and seeing the decision maker as completely unfair 
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Figure 2: Effects of Decision Maker Selection Method on 
Rejection Rates
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Figure 3: Effects of Decision Maker Self-Interest on Negativity toward 
the Decision and Decision Maker
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